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The Supreme Court changed the landscape of admitting 
hearsay statements into evidence with its decision in Crawford v. 
Washington.  In Crawford the Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause of the Constitution precludes the admission of out of court 
“testimonial” statements at trial unless either the witness is available to 
testify or there has been a previous opportunity for cross examination.1  
In the wake of this landmark decision, lower courts throughout the 
nation were left to fill in many holes, including the underlying 
question: what is testimonial?2  Many federal courts of appeals, 
including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gilbertson, have 
started explaining how they define testimonial, giving guidance to trial 
courts.3  Presently, not all federal courts of appeals have weighed in on 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 
2004); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Horton v. Allen, 370 
F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).   
1
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the issue, but the ones that have seem to be in consensus that a 
statement is testimonial when a reasonable person would believe that 
the statement could be used at trial.4   
This note illustrates how the Seventh Circuit has mistakenly 
modified this test by adding that the communication must be initiated 
by the government.5   The first part of this note gives an brief 
overview of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.  The second part of 
this note analyzes the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision.  The third 
part of this note explains how other courts of appeals have analyzed 
Crawford and how they define testimonial.  The fourth part of this 
note explains how the Seventh Circuit properly applies a reasonable 
expectation of the declarant test but also improperly asserts that the 
communication must be initiated by the government to be testimonial.  
The fourth part also explains that this addition strays from the 
reasoning behind Crawford.  
 




The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”6  
These statements are generally inadmissible at trial because they are 
considered inherently unreliable.7  This unreliability is inferred 
because there has been no opportunity for cross-examination, nor have 
the judge and jury had an opportunity to see the witness to weigh the 
                                                 
4 Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 796; Saget, 377 F.3d at 229; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675; 
Horton, 370 F.3d at 83-84; Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302; Hinton, 423 F.3d at 360. 
5 Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795-96. 
6 FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
7 FED. R. EVID. 802; Whitney Baugh, Why the Sky Didn’t Fall: Using Judicial 
Creativity to Circumvent Crawford v. Washington, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1835, 1845 
(2005). 
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witness’ credibility.8  These concerns are at the heart of the 
Confrontation Clause.9 
 
B. The Confrontation Clause 
 
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution 
requires that in all criminal prosecutions, “the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . .  to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”10   
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[i]f one were to 
read this language literally, it would require, on objection, the 
exclusion of any statement make by a declarant not present at trial,” 
but the Court has rejected this as “unintended and too extreme.”11  
Therefore, the Court has consistently allowed some hearsay exceptions 
to apply when the declarant is unavailable.12  However, there is little 
doubt that the Confrontation Clause was intended to exclude some 
hearsay.13  In fact, the Court has established that the Clause “reflects a 
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that a primary 
interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.”14  
The Confrontation Clause envisions  
 
a personal examination and cross-examination, in 
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the 
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face 
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and 
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner 
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worth yof 
belief.15  
                                                 
8 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
9 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
11 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). 
12 Id.. 
13 Id.; See also Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 156-57.   
14 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 
(1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). 
3
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The Framers included the Confrontation Clause within the 
Constitution because one of the main “evils” that worried them when 
they wrote the Constitution was the English “civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused.”16  During the 16th and 17th centuries, 
England commonly used justices of the peace, magistrates, and other 
agents of the Crown to conduct pretrial examinations of suspects and 
witnesses that were then used at trial in lieu of live testimony against 
the defendant.17   
 For years the Court’s decisions were largely consistent with 
this theory of the Confrontation Clause.18  In Mattox v. United States 
the Court allowed a hearsay statement to be admitted at trial, relying 
on the fact that the defendant had an adequate opportunity to confront 
the witness.19  The Court’s later cases continued to respect the 
Confrontation Clause.20  But eventually the Court’s rationale departed 
from the original intent of the Clause and allowed lower court’s 
decisions to do so as well.21 
 
C. Pre-Crawford Analysis 
 
For over twenty years, the Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts 
governed the admissibility of hearsay of an unavailable witness at 
trial.22 The Roberts Court rationalized that the Confrontation Clause 
operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible 
hearsay.23  First, the Court said that in adherence with the Framers’ 
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment 
establishes that the prosecution must either produce the witness for 
                                                 
16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004). 
17 Id. at 44. 
18 Id. at 57. 
19 156 U.S. at 250. 
20 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57; Mancuis v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 
(1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970). 
21 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
22 Id. at 60. 
23 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
4
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trial or prove that the witness is unavailable.24  Therefore, the 
prosecution is generally required to produce, or demonstrate the 
unavailability of, the declarant of the statement it wishes to use against 
the defendant, whether or not there has been a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.25  Once the witness is shown to be unavailable,26  
the Court rationalized that if the declarant is unavailable, there must be 
assurances that the hearsay is reliable.27  The underlying purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause is to enhance accuracy in the fact-finding 
process, therefore, it only approves of hearsay that is “marked with 
such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason 
of the general rule.”28  The Court opined that the main concern has 
been to “insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been 
widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed 
before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant.’”29  
Furthermore, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to “afford the 
trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement.”30  The Court said this “indicia of reliability” requirement 
was applied principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions 
rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any 
evidence within them comports with the “substance of the 
constitutional protection.”31    
The Court held in Roberts that when the proponent of an out of 
court statement is not present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is 
                                                 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (citing, inter alia,  Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. 
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)). 
26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
27 Id. at 66. 
28 Id. at 65-66 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).  
30 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 
(1920)). 
31 Roberts, 448 U.S.at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 
(1895)). 
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unavailable.32  Even then, however, the statement must bear adequate 
“indicia of reliability” to be admissible at trial.33  The Roberts Court 
rationalized that reliability can be inferred, without more, in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 
though the Court never defined what constituted a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception.34  Therefore, as long as the statement falls within 
such a firmly rooted hearsay exception it could be admitted at trial 
whether or not the declarant is available.35  If it does not, further 
inquiry is necessary to determine if the hearsay shows particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted at trial.36  The Roberts 
Court left to the lower courts the analysis of what it meant to have 
these guarantees of trustworthiness.37  
Therefore, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford a 
prosecutor had three ways to admit hearsay against a defendant, as 
long as the statement fit into one of the hearsay exceptions.  First, the 
prosecutor could make the witness available for cross-examination at 
the trial.38  Second, he could make a showing that the witness is 
unavailable and show that the hearsay falls into some firmly rooted 
exception to the hearsay rule.39  And third, he could make a showing 
that the witness is unavailable for trial and convince the trial judge that 
the hearsay has indicia of reliability that averts a Sixth Amendment 
issue.40  
 
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
 
With its decision in Crawford v. Washington in 2004, the 
Supreme Court re-wrote the rule of evidence as it pertains to the 
admissibility of hearsay from an unavailable declarant.  The Court 
                                                 





37 Id. at 56. 
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noted that the Roberts Court’s objective was not wrong, just the 
rationale.41  For years before the Crawford decision many scholars and 
members of the Court suggested that the Court revise its Confrontation 
Clause doctrine.42  Two different propositions had been suggested to 
the Court.43  First, the Confrontation Clause should only be applied to 
testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by hearsay 
law.44  Second, there should be an absolute bar to statements that are 
testimonial, unless there had been a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.45  The Court reiterated its rejection of the first proposal 
in Crawford, and left the Roberts test in place for non-testimonial 
hearsay evidence.46  But the Court noted the second proposal was 
clearly at issue in Crawford.47   
In Crawford the Court opined, that the Roberts test allowed a 
jury to hear evidence that was untested by the adversarial process and 
that was merely based on a judicial determination of reliability,48 
which was never the intent of the Founding Fathers.49  Instead of 
basing admissibility of evidence on the constitutionally prescribed 
method, the Roberts test did so based on a completely foreign one.50  
The Court noted that the Roberts test was based upon reliability of 
evidence in a way that was completely amorphous and entirely 
subjective.51  This was apparent to the Court by looking at the factor 
intensive tests used by the Courts of Appeals.52  The Court did not 
                                                 
41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2003). 
42 Id. at 60-61. 
43 Id. at 61. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992)). 
47 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.  
48 Id. at 62. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 63. 
52 Id. (See United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 1989) for 
analysis of the seven factor test used by the Seventh Circuit. The elements of the test 
consist of: 1) the character of the witness for truthfulness and honesty, and the 
availability of evidence on the issue; 2) whether the testimony was given voluntarily, 
under oath, subject to cross-examination and a penalty of perjury; 3) the witness’ 
7
Windon: <em>Crawford v. Washington</em> — How the Seventh Circuit Imprope
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
112 
believe that the Framers wanted to leave the Sixth Amendment’s 
protection “to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of reliability.”53  The Court admitted that though 
the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, “it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”54  In other words, the 
Court noted that the Constitution and the Confrontation Clause do not 
require that evidence actually be reliable, “but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”55  In fact, under the Roberts test, “some of the courts 
that admit untested testimonial statements find reliability in the very 
factors that make the statements testimonial.”56  However, it was not 
just the lack of reliability that bothered the Court, it was the fact that 
the Roberts test admitted “core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”57  The Court left the 
Roberts test in place when dealing with the admissibility of 
nontestimonial hearsay.58   
The Court further held that the Framers’ concern at the time of 
drafting the Confrontation Clause was to protect against “inquisitorial 
practices.”59  Therefore, defendants have a right to confront people 
                                                                                                                   
relationship with both the defendant and the government and his motivation to testify 
… .; 4) the extent to which the witness’ testimony reflects his personal knowledge; 
5) whether the witness ever recanted his testimony; 6) the existence of corroborating 
evidence; and 7) the reasons for the witness’ unavailability.). 
53 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Id. at 61. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 65 (citing Nowlin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 579 S.E.2d 367, 370-
72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (the fact that the defendnat’s statements were made while in 
custody on pending charges made this statement clearly against penal interest and 
thus more reliable).  
57 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
58 See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (2005) (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law — as does Roberts, and as would an approach that 
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”)). 
59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
8
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who “bear testimony” against them.60  The Court said that “the 
constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right 
of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a 
specific type of out-of-court statement.”61  Thus, the Confrontation 
Clause applies to testimonial evidence, requiring unavailability of the 
witness combined with a prior opportunity for cross-examination.62  
Therefore, the Confrontation Clause requires the exclusion of hearsay 
testimony unless either the witness is available for trial or there has 
been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.63  Presumably, the 
only possible exception is that of a dying declaration.  The Court 
refused to decide that issue, but stated that “if this exception must be 
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”64 
 
A.  Why the Court Found Cross-Examinations So Important 
 
The Crawford decision displays why cross-examination is 
vitally important to the survival of our adversarial process.65  The 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of the accused to confront 
hostile witnesses; therefore, it protects the right of cross-
examination.66  Defendants have the right to test the credibility of their 
accusers and confrontation increases the likelihood that an accusation 
by an adverse witness is truthful by requiring the witness to confront 
the accused.67  The Court has said that “the absence of proper 
confrontation at trials calls into question the ultimate integrity of the 
                                                 
60 Id. (The Court in Crawford quoted the definition of testimony as “[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.” (citing NOAH WEBSTER, 1 AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). 
61 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
62 Id. at 69 (“Non-testimonial” hearsay does not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause and admissibility is determined by applying appropriate rules of evidence). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 56 n.6.  
65 Id. at 65. 
66 Baugh, supra  note 7, at 1845. 
67 Id. at 1846 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1920); Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)). 
9
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fact-finding process.”68  The Court further said that when “testimonial 
statements are at issue, the only indicia of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands are the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”69  The Court went on to analogize the 
disposal of confrontation simply because the evidence is reliable to the 
disposal of a jury trial simply because the defendant is obviously 
guilty.70   
When the Framers inserted the Confrontation Clause into the 
Sixth Amendment, they intended it to include a right of cross-
examination.71  This was obvious to the Crawford Court by looking at 
debate prior to the ratification of the Constitution.  Many of the 
“declarations of rights adopted around the time of the Revolution” 
included a right to confrontation, but the proposed Federal 
Constitution did not.72  This caused much of objection, specifically 
during the ratifying convention in Massachusetts from Abraham 
Holmes who said: “The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; … 
whether [the defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and 
have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told….”73  
From this, the Court noted that the inclusion of a right to confrontation 
in the Federal Constitution was specifically intended to guarantee the 
right to cross examination.74 
 
B.  Definition of Testimonial 
 
In Crawford the Supreme Court refused to define what makes a 
statement testimonial, stating that “we leave for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial.”75  All the 
Court explicitly stated was that the term testimonial “applies at a 
                                                 
68 Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
69 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
70 Id. at 62. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 48. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 48-49. 
75 Id. at 68. 
10
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minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”76  Therefore, 
trial and appellate courts throughout the country have been left to 
provide their own definition of testimonial.  But, even though the 
Court did not explicitly define testimonial, it did provide the lower 
courts with guidance. 
The Court provided three “formulations of [the] core class of 
testimonial statements.”77  The first, which Crawford himself urged 
upon the Court, is that testimonial statements consist of “ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent… such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 
to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”78  The second, which 
Justice Scalia took from concurring justices in past decisions, defines 
testimonial statements as “extrajudicial statements… in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, 
or confessions.”79  The last, which was suggested in an amici curia 
from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, describes 
testimonial statements as those that are made under circumstances 
which would “lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”80  
Since the Court refused to define testimonial it is logical to 
look at the schools of thought of the definition of testimonial that the 
Court referenced in its decision.  Once one accepts what the Court 
articulates in Crawford, that testimonial evidence is not limited to in-
court or sworn testimony,81 then these two schools of thought are in 
complete opposition to each other.  The first is a very narrow 
definition that has been advanced in the work of Professor Ahkil Reed 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51-52). 
78 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
79 Id. (quoting White v. Ill., 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 50, 52 n.3. 
11
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Amar from Yale University.82   Professor Amar believes that a witness 
provides testimonial evidence when he testifies “either by taking the 
stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, 
videotapes, and the like.”83  This would barely be more than the 
minimum standard that the Court set out in Crawford.84  The second 
school of thought, championed by Professor Richard Friedman at the 
University of Michigan,85 is much broader and encompasses a 
statement that is “made in circumstances in which a reasonable person 
would realize that it likely would be used in the investigation or 
prosecution of a crime.”86  It is important to note that this theory is not 
based upon what the speaker actually believed, but what a reasonable 
person would believe, which is very close to the one suggested by the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.87  Based on his 
proposed definition, Friedman offers five rules of thumb: 
 
A statement made knowingly to the authorities that 
describes criminal activity is almost always testimonial.  
A statement made by a person claiming to be the victim 
of a crime and describing the crime is usually 
testimonial, whether made to the authorities or not.  If, 
in the case of a crime committed over a short period of 
time, a statement is made before the crime is 
committed, it almost certainly is not testimonial.  A 
statement made by one participant in a criminal 
enterprise to another, intended to further the enterprise, 
is not testimonial.  And neither is a statement made in 
the course of going about one’s ordinary business, 
                                                 
82 Franny A. Forsman, Esq., Rene L. Valladares, Esq., Grappling with what 
statements are testimonial under Crawford v. Washington: “The Reasonable 
Expectation of the Declarant” Test, (October 2005) NEV. LAW. 26 (2005). 
83 Id. 
84 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
85 Forsman, supra note 82, at 26. 
86 Id.; Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1240-41 (2002). 
87 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
12
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made before the criminal act has occurred or with no 
recognition that it relates to criminal activity.88 
 
 These two ideas examined by the Court in Crawford give 
guideposts to lower courts about the Supreme Court’s intended 
definition of testimonial. 
 
III. HOW SISTER CIRCUITS ARE DEFINING TESTIMONIAL 
 
About half of the federal courts of appeals have given trial 
courts guidance about their definition of testimonial.89  Some of these 
courts have utilized the “core class of testimonial statements” that the 
Court put forth and others have analyzed the two schools of thought 
referenced in Crawford.90  Whichever methodology they use, the 
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue all agree that a 
statement is testimonial when a reasonable declarant would anticipate 
its use at trial. 
 
A.  Core Class of Testimonial Statements 
 
 In United States v. Summers, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recognized that even though the Supreme Court did not 
rigidly define the term testimonial, it was not “devoid of guidance.”91  
In fact, the Court provided relevant “guideposts” to frame lower 
courts’ analyses.92  First, the Court provided a baseline, saying 
“[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal 
                                                 
88 United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673-74 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Friedman, supra note 86, at 1042-43).  
89 See United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Cromer, 389 F.3d 662; Horton v. Allen, 370 
F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005).   
90 Id. 
91 Summers, 414 F.3d at 1300. 
92 Id. 
13
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trial; and to police interrogations.”93  The court further noted that the 
“formulations of the core class of testimonial statements” that the 
Supreme Court referred to in Crawford constituted the rest of the 
guidance needed.94  The Tenth Circuit held that the “common nucleus” 
in the Court’s reasoning in Crawford was the reasonable expectations 
of the declarant.95  Therefore, the Tenth Circuit said that a test that 
emphasizes the reasonable expectations of the declarant is most 
closely aligned with the original underpinnings of the Sixth 
Amendment.96  Though it declined to define this test, the court 
ultimately said that testimony by an arresting officer relating to a 
statement by the co-defendant, who did not testify, was testimonial.97 
In Horton v. Allen, a First Circuit case, the defendant objected 
to the admission of hearsay testimony from a woman who had a 
conversation with Horton’s accomplice who was not on trial.98  The 
court also looked to the three “formulations of [the] core class of 
testimonial statements.”99  In doing so the court said that not only were 
the statements made at Horton’s trial not contained in formalized 
documents such as affidavits, depositions, or prior testimony but the 
statements admitted at trial were not “statements under circumstances 
in which an objective person would reasonably believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”100   
In United States v Hinton, the Third Circuit also relied on the 
“core class of testimonial statements.”101  In doing so it recognized an 
appreciation for “the third formulation of testimonial offered by the 
Court in Crawford” and it endorsed this same test.102  Even though the 
Sixth Circuit did not rely upon these formulations of testimonial as 
much, the court in Hinton noted that the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in 
                                                 
93 Id. at 1301 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). 
94 Summers, 414 F.3d at 1301-02 (internal citation omitted).  
95 Id. at 1302. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1303. 
98 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004). 
99 Id. at 84 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)). 
100 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d at 84. 
101 United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2005). 
102 Id. 
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United States v. Cromer was instructive.103  The court believed that the 
reasonable expectation of the declarant test was important because the 
“broader definition is necessary to ensure that the adjudication system 
does not effectively invite witnesses to testify in informal ways that 
avoid confrontation.”104 
 
B.  Two Schools of Thought 
 
 The Sixth Circuit has done the most in depth evaluation of 
these two schools of thought. In United States v. Cromer, the court 
admitted into evidence statements by a confidential informant to an 
officer.105  The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by not 
requiring the production of the confidential informant after admitting 
the hearsay statements made by the informant.106  Just as the Tenth 
Circuit did in Summers, this court recognized that Crawford provided 
guidance on the definition of testimonial.107  Specifically, it looked to 
the works of Professor Amar and Professor Friedman that the 
Crawford Court relied on when redefining the Confrontation 
Clause.108   
The Sixth Circuit found that the approach put forth by 
Professor Friedman is the most consistent with the stated purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause, especially in light of the Court’s emphasis, 
in Crawford, that the Clause refers to those that “bear testimony 
against the accused.”109  The Sixth Circuit believed that statements 
that are made to the authorities when the declarant knows that they 
will most likely be used in trial are the exact statements that the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to protect against, whether or not 
                                                 
103 Id. 360 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
104 Hinton, 423 F.3d at 360 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cromer, 389 F.3d at 674-75 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
105 Cromer, 389 F.3d  at 666. 
106 Id. at 670. 
107 Id. at 673. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 674. 
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they are formal statements.110  The court recognized that this “broader 
definition” is necessary to make sure that a witness does not 
intentionally testify in an informal way to avoid confrontation, which 
would eviscerate our adjudicative and adversarial process.111  In fact, 
the Sixth Circuit went on to note that there is actually a greater danger 
to defendants to allow admission, without confrontation, of an 
informal statement volunteered to police as opposed to one elicited by 
police.112  The court stated that “one can imagine the temptation that 
someone who bears a grudge might have to volunteer to police, 
truthfully or not, information of the commission of a crime, especially 
when that person is assured he will not be subject to confrontation.”113  
The Sixth Circuit referenced an example by Professor Friedman of a 
rape victim that is assured by a private rape counselor that she is able 
to give a videotaped statement that can be provided to prosecutors and 
there is little chance that she will have to testify in court.114  The court 
notes that this will only give witnesses incentive to ensure that all 
testimony they give is informal.115  Therefore, the Sixth Circuit stated 
that the proper inquiry is “whether the declarant intends to bear 
testimony against the accused,” and that intent can be inferred by 
deciding whether a reasonable person would anticipate that the 
statement would be used against the accused.116  It is within this 
framework that the Sixth Circuit decided that a confidential 
informants’ statement are testimonial.   
The Second Circuit Court also looked to these schools of 
thought in its analysis of testimonial.117  In United States v. Saget, the 
court held that a statement the defendant made to a confidential 
informant was not testimonial, when the defendant did not know that 
the person was an informant.118  That court discussed the Supreme 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 675. 
113 Id. (emphasis added). 
114 Id. (emphasis added). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004). 
118 Id. at 229-30. 
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Court’s reference of Professor Friedman’s article in Crawford and 
noted that even though Crawford does not explicitly endorse 
Friedman’s views, it does suggest that  the “determinative factor in 
determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s 
awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used 
at a trial.”119 
 
IV. DOES THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY DEFINE TESTIMONIAL? 
 
A.  The Seventh Circuit: Post Crawford 
 
For almost two years after Crawford, the Seventh Circuit did 
not provide any real guidance to the trial courts about its definition of 
testimonial.  Instead, the court simply ruled on the facts before it, 
saying whether or not the hearsay at issue was testimonial.  During 
this time the court indicated that Crawford does not apply to 
sentencing hearings,120 police alerts,121 or a government file containing 
intercepted correspondence incriminating the defendant.122  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit followed the many other circuits that 
held statements of co-conspirators are not hearsay and, therefore, are 
not testimonial.123  The court also held that it is doubtless a casual 
conversation between two people would not be considered 
testimonial.124  But the court has held that a confession of a co-
                                                 
119 Id. at 228. 
120 United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the 
relevant provision to sentencing is the Due Process Clause and not the Confrontation 
Clause).  
121 United States v. Prince, 418 F.3d 771,780-81 n.5 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating 
that the admission of the police alert was not for the truth of the matter asserted and 
therefore not hearsay and even if it was being used to establish truth of the matter 
asserted it would not necessarily be testimonial). 
122 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 576 (7th Cir. 2005). 
123 United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Reyes 362 F.3d 536, 540 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004). 
124 United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).  
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defendant, who was tried separately, was testimonial.125  Though it 
could be interpreted that the court was applying the same reasonable 
expectation of the declarant test, the court never explicitly held either 
way.   
That all changed when the Seventh Circuit published its recent 
decision in United States v. Gilbertson.126  In Gilbertson, the 
defendant asserted that the admission of odometer statements from the 
certificates of title violated his Sixth Amendment rights.127  In its 
decision, the court did not go into an abundance of detail but noted 
that the Supreme Court provided guidance for lower courts about the 
definition of testimonial.128  The Seventh Circuit, like the Tenth, First 
and Third, turned to the three formulations of the “core class of 
testimonial statements.”129   
Because Gilbertson himself focused on the second formulation, 
the court first focused on that formulation of testimonial.130  The 
second formulation that was mentioned by the Court in Crawford was 
based on Justice Thomas’ concurrence in White v. Illinois.131  The 
Seventh Circuit noted that the “evil” Justice Thomas referred to in his 
opinion “was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations against the accused.”132  
The court went on to note that “reading Justice Thomas’ formulation 
with the first and the third formulations, it is readily apparent from 
Crawford that ‘[o]nly statements made following government official 
initiated ex parte examinations or interrogation developed in 
anticipation of or in aid of criminal litigation are encompassed within 
the core meaning of the confrontation clause.’”133   
                                                 
125 See United States v. Jones, 371 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2004). 
126 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006). 
127 Id. at 794. 
128 Id. at 795. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992). 
132 Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
50 (2004)). 
133 Id. at 795 (quoting MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 7032 (2d ed. Supp. 2005)). 
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Therefore, the Seventh Circuit adopted the same reasonable 
expectation of the declarant test used by many other circuits.134  But, 
the court did not end there.  Unlike any other circuit, the court required 
that communication be initiated by the government for any statements 
to be considered testimonial.135    
 
B.  Is the Seventh Circuit Correct? 
 
 Yes and no.   
The decision of the Seventh Circuit as well as many other 
circuits to apply the reasonable expectation of the declarant test is 
appropriate in light of the Court’s reasoning in Crawford.  Since the 
Court chose not to define testimonial; individual courts were left to 
make that determination for themselves.  As many circuits noted, in 
doing so, they are not without guidance from the Supreme Court.136   
 The first thing that most courts have done is look at what 
parameters the Crawford Court did draw.  As the Tenth Circuit noted 
in Summers, the Court established a “baseline”137 in Crawford, 
explicitly saying that at a minimum the term testimonial applies “to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.”138  Therefore, courts have a 
starting point from which to work.  Furthermore, the Court did draw 
the line on the other side of the spectrum.  The Court noted that “[a]n 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”139  These are not the only guideposts; the 
Court also gave three “core formulations” of testimonial as well as to 
reference two specific scholars that have debated the definition of 
testimonial.140  As the Second Circuit noted, it is the common nucleus 
                                                 
134 Id. at 796.  
135 Id. at 795-96. 
136 Id. at 795; United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2004). 
137 United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1301 (10th Cir. 2005). 
138 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
139 Id. at 51. 
140 Id. 51-52. 
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present in the formulations that “centers on the reasonable expectation 
of the declarant.”141  The court further noted that it is the reasonable 
expectation of the declarant that “distinguishes the flippant remark, 
proffered to a casual acquaintance from the true testimonial 
statement.”142 
But where the Seventh Circuit went wrong was finding that for 
a statement to be testimonial the communication must have been 
initiated by the government.143  In doing so, the court’s analysis of 
testimonial became much more aligned with Professor Amar’s 
definition than Professor Friedman’s.  But this definition is not inline 
with the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause.  In Cromer, the 
Sixth Circuit quickly dispensed with Professor Amar’s definition of 
testimonial.144  It noted that “[t]he Crawford Court found the absence 
of an oath not to be determinative in considering whether a statement 
is testimonial” and the court noted that the other formalities identified 
by Professor Amar were not necessary components of a testimonial 
statement.145  The court further declared that the danger to a defendant 
might actually be greater if the admitted statement is volunteered to 
police rather than elicited through formalized police interrogation, 
“[o]ne can imagine the temptation that someone who bears a grudge 
might have to volunteer to police, truthfully, or not, information of the 
commission of a crime, especially when that person is assured he will 
not be subject to confrontation.”146  The Confrontation Clause applies 
to witnesses who “bear testimony,”147 therefore; the proper inquiry 
revolves around the intent of the declarant and not who initiates the 
conversation.148  Basing the definition on who initiates the 
conversation would only encourage witnesses to give statements 
informally.149  It is also important to note the purpose of the 
                                                 
141 Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302. 
142 Id. 
143 Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 795-96. 
144 United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2004). 
145 Id. at 674. 
146 Id. at 675. 
147 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
148 See Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675. 
149 Id. 
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Confrontation Clause was not just to curb lying, but it was also 
implemented to give the judge and jury an opportunity to see the 
witness to weigh the witness’ credibility as well as the witness’ 
recollection of the events.150  Therefore, even if a person who 
volunteers information about a crime is truthful, the defense is 
supposed to have the opportunity to cross-examine that witness about 
the accuracy of the information.  Applying the Seventh Circuit’s test 
would strip the defense of this right.  
Furthermore, the Court noted that “[t]he most notorious 
instances of civil-law examination occurred in the great political trials 
of the 16th and 17th centuries.”151  During these trials English courts 
refused defendants’ requests that accusers be brought before them.152    
The Court used the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as one of the 
best examples of what the Framers wanted to avoid with the 
implementation of the Confrontation Clause.153  Lord Cobham, 
Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, implicated Raleigh in both an 
examination and in a letter that he sent to the court without 
provocation.154  Raleigh believed that Lord Cobham would recant and 
“demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that the Proof of 
the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him 
speak it.”155  The court refused and allowed the reading of the 
examination and the letter into evidence.156  One of the trial judges 
“later lamented that the justice of England has never been so degraded 
and inured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.”157  This 
case spurred reform that not only required face to face accusations at 
                                                 
150 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
151 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
152 Id. at 43 (citing J. STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
326 (1883); W. HOLDSWORTH, 9 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 216-17, 228 (3d ed. 
1944)). 
153 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (quoting 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16 (1603)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
156 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
157 Id. (quoting D. JARDINE, 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS, 520 (1832) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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arraignment, but the Court of King’s Bench said that it mandated the 
right to cross-examine.158   
In dispensing of the Roberts test, the Court noted that “[t]he 
Raleigh trial itself involved the very sorts of reliability determinations 
that Roberts authorizes.”159  In that trial, the prosecution used “many 
of the arguments a court applying Roberts might invoke today: that 
Cobham’s statement were self-incriminating, that they were not made 
in the heart of passion, and that they were not extracted from him upon 
the hopes or promise of a Pardon.”160  Furthermore, the Court went on 
to say that,  
 
It is not plausible that the Framers’ only objection to 
the trial was that Raleigh’s judges did not properly 
weigh these factors before sentencing him to death.  
Rather, the problem was that the judges refused to 
allow Raleigh to confront Cobham in court, where he 
could cross-examine him and try to expose his 
accusation as a lie.161 
 
The main “evil” the Framers’ attempted to protect against with 
the inclusion of the Confrontation Clause was these “civil law 
examinations,”162 but this protection was not limited to government 
initiation communication.  In fact, looking at the Raleigh case, that the 
Court relied heavily on in its Crawford decision, it is apparent that the 
Court did not intend to limit testimonial evidence to formal 
investigations or interrogations.163  The Court noted in Crawford that 
one of the pieces of evidence used against Raleigh was a letter that 
was sent without provocation.164  The Court used the introduction at 
                                                 
158  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45 (citing King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 
(1696)). 
159 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
160 Id. (citation omitted). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 44. 
163 Id. at 45. 
164 Id. 
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trial of both the pre-trial examination and the letter as examples of 
what the Framers tried to avoid with the implementation of the 
Confrontation Clause.165  Accordingly, it is apparent that the Court did 
not intend to limit the definition of testimonial to statements that were 
obtained through government initiated communication.   
 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit misread opinions from its 
sister courts.  In Gilbertson, after declaring that a testimonial statement 
is one in which the communication is initiated by the government; the 
court noted that “[o]ther circuits have come to a similar 
conclusion.”166  This is simply inaccurate.  While it is true that the 
other circuits the Seventh Circuit cites all agree about the use of the 
reasonable expectation of the declarant test, not one of those circuits 




Since the Supreme Court handed down its Crawford decision, 
courts across the country have attempted to decipher what testimonial 
means.  Some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have given 
guidance to the trial courts, holding that the applicable test is whether 
a reasonable person would believe the statement would be used at 
trial.167  Based on the Court’s analysis of the Confrontation Clause and 
the guideposts it left for lower courts, this is the appropriate decision.  
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit did not end its analysis there.  The 
Seventh Circuit further opined that for a statement to be testimonial it 
must be the product of government initiated communication.168  By 
looking to the three formulations of testimonial statements, the two 
                                                 
165 Id. at 44. 
166 See United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Cromer, 389 
F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 
(3d Cir. 2005)).   
167. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d at 796; Saget, 377 F.3d at 229; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 
675; Horton, 370 F.3d at 83-84; Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302; Hinton, 423 F.3d at 
360. 
168 Gilberston, 435 F.3d at 795-96. 
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schools of thought concerning testimonial and to trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh that the Court referenced in Crawford, it is apparent that this 
formulation is simply the wrong conclusion to draw from Crawford 
and the history of the Confrontation Clause. 
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